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ABSTRACT
In past research concerning spontaneous motoric and symbolic mediation
in observational learning (Berger, et al
. ,
1979), familiar observers
who had symbolic codes for the model's behavior benefited from the use
of these codes; unfamiliar observers who had no available symbolic
codes benefited from the use of motor mimicry. Familiar observers,
however, still engaged in a considerable amount of mimicry. This
study examined two hypotheses concerning why familiar subjects con-
tinued to mimic: that mimicry acts as a temporary coding device when
observers do not have enough time to think of familiar symbolic codes
for a model's behavior and that observers increase their use of mimi-
cry when they expect to have to perform the model's behavior as a test
of their learning. The results showed that there was no difference
in mimicry between groups of observers who did have enough time to
think of symbolic codes and those who did not. Observers who expected
to have to perform the model's behavior engaged in more mimicry than
those who expected a recognition test. In addition, some observers
reported engaging in unintentional mimicry. The results suggest
that mimicry in past research may have occurred automatically and
unintentionally or in preparation for a performance test.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT iii
Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. METHOD 8
Subj ects 8
Procedure 8
III. RESULTS 13
Sex Differences 13
Manipulation Checks and Suspiciousness 13
Reliability of the Experimenter's and Subjects'
Reports 13
Self-reported and Observed Mediation 14
Gesture Learning 16
Relationship Between Mediators and Learning 17
Unintentional Mediation 18
IV. DISCUSSION 19
FOOTNOTES 25
REFERENCES 26
iv
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Previous research has demonstrated that imaginal and verbal coding
and motor mimicry can all act as mediators to facilitate observational
learning (Bandura, Grusec, $ Menlove, 1966; Bandura § Jeffery, 1974;
Berger, 1966; Berger, Carli, Hammersla, Karshmer, $ Sanchez, 1979).
However, subjects in studies of observational learning are often in-
structed to use particular mediators (Bandura, Grusec, § Menlove, 1966;
Bandura § Jeffery, 1974; Gerst, 1971; Ito, 1975; Jeffery, 1976). The
results of these studies, therefore, cannot easily be generalized
to the natural environment where observers rarely are specifically
instructed to use particular mediators. Few studies have examined the
conditions that affect spontaneous mediation or the relationship be-
tween this type of mediation and learning.
A series of studies (Berger, et al
. ,
1979) examined the relation-
ship between subjects' spontaneous use of verbal, imaginal, and motoric
mediation and observational learning. The first experiment investigated
whether the use of motoric mediation would be reduced when subjects
have symbolic (verbal, imaginal, or numeric) codes at their disposal,
and increased when subjects have difficulty coming up with symbolic
codes. If a subject can code a behavior with a word, letter, or
number, and is able to perform the behavior already, he or she may not
have to mimic the behavior to learn it. Subjects who do not have
symbolic codes at their disposal may depend on mimicry to mediate the
behavior.
2In this first experiment, the behavior demonstrated by the model
consisted of pairs of hand signals from the Manual Alphabet for the
Deaf. These gestures were chosen because subjects spontaneously mimic
them (Berger, 1966) and because they are associated with symbolic codes
(letters). One group of subjects was familiar with the Manual Alphabet
and could presumably code and perform the gestures. The other group
was unfamiliar with the Manual Alphabet and, therefore, did not have
symbolic codes for the gestures. In addition, half of the subjects
were instructed to learn the pairs of hand signals and half were told
to merely watch them. This was done to determine if subjects who did
not intend to learn the gestures would use different mediators than
those who did intend to learn them.
The results indicated that when subjects increased their use of
symbolic codes (imagery and letter coding) they did not reduce their use
of mimicry. Although familiar subjects used more symbolic codes than
unfamiliar subjects, they still mimicked as much as the unfamiliar
group. Individuals who were instructed to learn mimicked more than
those who merely watched the model's performance, although the latter
group did engage in some mimicry. Learning instructions did not affect
the use of letter or imaginal codes. Subjects apparently believed that
mimicry would aid their learning; in fact, they reported that they
used mimicry to help themselves learn the gestures. However, mimicry
was positively correlated with learning for the unfamiliar group only.
The use of letter codes was positively correlated with learning for
familiar subjects. Mimicry appeared to aid learning only when the
3observer did not already have symbolic codes for the gestures.
The results of the Berger, et al. (1979) studies indicated, first,
that observers with familiar (salient, well- learned) symbolic codes for
the model's behavior benefited from the use of these codes. They did
not need to use mimicry, since they could already perform the gestures
and needed only to employ the symbolic codes to learn them. Yet, even
these observers engaged in a considerable amount of mimicry. Why?
Second, the studies indicated that observers who were instructed
to merely watch the model's performance and who, presumably, had no
intentions to learn it, still mimicked. Why did they mimic?
This experiment examines the function of mimicry for subjects who
have familiar codes for a model's behavior. Perhaps mimicry assists
learning indirectly for these subjects. A two-staged coding process
could be involved (Berger, et al
,
1979). When an observer with familiar
codes is unable to immediately come up with the codes, he or she may
resort to mimicry to temporarily retain the model's behavior. Mimicry
may then provide time for the observer to retrieve and employ the
symbolic codes. The use of mimicry should increase when the observer
is given less time to come up with these codes, that is, when his or
her exposure to the model's behavior is brief. Mimicry should not be
necessary as long as the observer is viewing the model's behavior.
A second possible function of mimicry for subjects who have
well-learned symbolic codes for the model's performance may be to
allow subjects to practice their performance of the gestures. In the
Berger, et al. (1979) studies subjects who were told to learn the
4gestures engaged in more mimicry than those instructed to merely
watch the performance. Those in the learning condition probably
expected to have to perform the gestures for the experimenter as a test
of their learning. They may have used mimicry to practice their
performance of the gestures.
Finally, subjects who continued to mimic even when they were not
specifically instructed to learn the gestures may have done so unin-
tentionally, without much awareness.
One purpose of this experiment is to test the hypothesis that
subjects use mimicry as a temporary coding device when they do not
have enough time to think of their well-learned verbal codes. To
insure that all subjects were familiar with the model's behavior, it
consisted of commonly practiced cultural gestures used in the United
States. Because the gestures have salient verbal codes associated
with them and because they are frequently performed, subjects were
expected to have no difficulty reproducing or, when given ample time,
verbally coding the gestures.
In order to test the hypothesis, subjects received either a serial
presentation of the gestures or a simultaneous presentation. Subjects
given the serial presentation were expected to engage in more mimicry.
In this condition, subjects unable to immediately come up with a word
code for a particular gesture (because it would be presented for only
a short amount of time) would have to perform the gesture to retain it.
Subjects receiving a simultaneous presentation were expected to engage
in little or no mimicry, since, in this case, all the gestures were
5presented simultaneously and continuously throughout the learning trial.
In this condition, subjects unable to immediately think of a word code
for a particular gesture could simply spend more time observing that
gesture.
A second hypothesis about why subjects mimic familiar gestures is
that when subjects expect to have to perform the gestures for the
experimenter as a test of their learning, they increase their use of
mimicry to practice performing the gestures. Subjects who do not
expect to have to perform the gestures should engage in little mimicry.
In order to test the second hypothesis, half of the subjects in
this experiment were instructed to expect a performance test as a
measure of learning while the other subjects were instructed to expect
a recognition test. It was predicted that subjects in the performance
condition would engage in more mimicry than those in the recognition
condition. Subjects expecting a recognition test should not be con-
cerned about their ability to perform the gestures and should not,
therefore, engage in much mimicry.
A third purpose of this investigation is to determine whether
subjects will report engaging in unintentional mimicry. In this study,
subjects were asked to indicate why they mimicked the gestures by
checking one of three responses: to learn the gestures, automatically
and for no particular reason, or for some other reason.
1
Some subjects
were expected to report unintentional mimicry, especially if they were
in the recognition condition or the simultaneous presentation condition.
These subjects did not have to mimic as a temporary coding device or
6to prepare themselves for a performance test and, therefore, did not
need mimicry to learn the gestures. Any mimicry they engaged in should
have been unintentional.
The following predictions have been made: 1) subjects receiving
a serial presentation of the gestures should engage in more mimicry
than subjects receiving a simultaneous presentation; 2) more mimicry
should occur in the performance test condition than in the recognition
test condition; and 3) subjects in the simultaneous presentation
condition and in the recognition test condition should report engaging
in more unintentional mimicry than subjects in the serial presentation
and performance conditions, respectively.
Subjects could use imaginal codes to temporarily retain the
2
gestures in addition to or instead of mimicry. It was predicted,
therefore, that greater amounts of imaginal coding would occur in the
serial presentation condition than in the simultaneous presentation
condition. Because the use of imagery and mimicry was expected to lead
to the use of word coding in the serial presentation condition, the
relationship of word coding to both imaginal coding and mimicry was
predicted to be stronger in this condition than when the gestures
were presented simultaneously.
No differences in verbal coding was predicted between the two
presentation conditions. Although subjects receiving a simultaneous
presentation should have more time to recall their well-learned
symbolic codes than those receiving a serial presentation, subjects in
the latter group were expected to be able to compensate for the lack of
time by using mimicry to retain the gestures that they could not
immediately code so that those gestures could be verbally coded.
No differences in verbal or imaginal coding were predicted
between the two instruction conditions.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Fifty-six women and 28 men were recruited from undergraduate
psychology courses at the University of Massachusetts. They
participated for class credit.
Procedure
Subjects participated individually and were randomly assigned to
one of four conditions in a 2 x 2 factorial design. The independent
variables were Presentation (Serial or Simultaneous) and Instructions
(Recognition or Performance Test)
.
The gestures used in this experiment were pretested on a sample
of 40 undergraduate psychology students and were chosen if at least 85%
of the students who viewed slides of the gestures came up with the
same word or synonyms. The eight gestures, all commonly used in the
United States, were presented to the subjects on slides.
In the Serial Presentation, the gestures were projected separately,
each on one of eight slides, in the following order: "stop 11 (a palm
facing the viewer with all the fingers together and vertical and
the thumb extended) , MOKM (an index finger and a thumb forming
a circle and the remaining fingers vertical and slightly separated),
8
9"two" (index and middle fingers forming a vertical "V" with the thumb
pressed against the remaining bent fingers)
,
"pugh" (the side of the
model's face toward the subject, with the thumb and index finger
pinching the model's nose and the remaining fingers forming a fist),
"shh" (the model's face toward the subject with the lips slightly-
pursed and the index finger pressed vertically across the lips)
,
"you"
(index finger pointing at the subject with the remaining fingers
forming a fist), "call" (the model facing the subject with one hand
cupped around an open mouth) , and "pray" (hands held together with the
thumbs crossed).^ Each slide appeared for 1.5 seconds with .6 seconds
between slides."'
In the Simultaneous Presentation, all the gestures appeared on a
single slide for 16.2 seconds (the total amount of time that the sub-
jects had to view the gestures was the same in each condition).
"Stop," "OK," "two," and "pugh" were presented, left to right, across
the top of the slide; "shh," "you," "call," and "pray" were presented,
left to right, across the bottom of the slide. This arrangement pro-
vided some control over the order in which subjects viewed the gestures
because people in our culture read left to right, and top to bottom.
Slides in both presentation conditions were made from the same
photographs to insure that the gestures were identical. The size of
the gestures was also controlled as follows. In the Serial Presenta-
tion, the gestures appeared in the center of the slide, covering 1/8
the area of the slide, the surrounding area forming a black border.
In the Simultaneous Presentation, each of the eight gestures was also
1/8 the area of the slide; together all eight gestures filled
the
10
slide. Both presentations were in black and white.
Subjects were brought into the laboratory and seated near a slide
projector, facing a white blank wall. The female experimenter gave the
following instructions to the subjects in the Simultaneous Condition:
"This is a learning study. You are to view and learn eight hand
gestures. They will be presented to you by this slide projector. All
eight gestures will be presented simultaneously on a single slide.
You will see one slide; all the gestures will be on that slide. There
are a couple of blank slides ahead of the slide with the gestures on
it. I will leave the room while you are observing the slide so I
won't disturb your learning. I will return after the presentation to
test your learning of the gestures on the slide. M
Subjects in the Serial Condition received the same instructions
except that they were told that each gesture would appear on separate
slides and that they would see eight slides, each presenting one
gesture.
Subjects in the Recognition Condition were then instructed, ?rYou
will have to pick out the gestures from pictures of a number of other
gestures as a test of your learning. " Those in the Performance
Condition were instructed, MYou will have to perform the gestures for
me as a test of your learning. 11
After the instructions were given the experimenter asked each
subject if there were any questions, turned on the slide projector,
and exited from the room. She then entered a room adjacent to the
laboratory, observed the subject covertly over a closed circuit tele-
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vision system, and made a written record of all the gestures that the
subject performed.
The gestures were presented directly in front of the subject on
the blank wall. The laboratory was dimly lit, dark enough so that the
presentation would be clearly visible and light enough for the
experimenter to see the subject. In all conditions the subject viewed
a number of blank slides before the actual presentation began. This
was done so that the subjects would know how quickly the projector
operated and how much time they would have to observe the gestures.
After the single presentation was completed, the experimenter returned
to the laboratory and tested the subject. All subjects were required
to perform the gestures as a test of their learning. The experimenter
then administered the questionnaire.
The questionnaire began with the following four items: 1) Did
you perform any of the gestures while you were watching the slides?
2) Did you form a mental image of any of the gestures while you were
watching the slides? 3) Did you use a word (or words) to represent any
of the gestures while you were watching the slides? 4) Did you use
some other coding system to represent any of the gestures while you
were watching the slides (other than images or words, e.g., numbers,
letters, etc.)? Each of the four items was illustrated with drawings
of the gestures used on the slides. Subjects were asked to respond
to each question by circling the drawing of each gesture they coded.
In addition, for items 3 and 4, subjects were asked to write the word,
number, letter, or other symbol used to code each gesture under the
12
appropriate drawing.
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of the following
questions: 1) If you performed any of the gestures, why did you
perform them? 2) If you formed images of any of the gestures, why
did you form images? and 3) If you used words to code the gestures,
why did you use words? Subjects answered these questions by checking
one of the following three responses: to learn them, automatically for
no particular reason, or for some other reason. Subjects checking
"for some other reason" were asked to give an explanation of that
reason.
Finally, the questionnaire included manipulation checks to
determine whether subjects expected to be tested on their learning of
the gestures, whether they expected the test to involve a performance
of the gestures, and if they understood the instructions. In addition,
subjects were asked if they had any suspicions concerning the
instructions they received, and, if so, to describe those suspicions.
After the questionnaire was completed, the experimenter gave the
subject a thorough debriefing, including an explanation that his or
her behavior had been observed during the presentation and why. The
subject then received credit for participating in the experiment and
left.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Sex Differences
No sex differences were obtained for any of the variables in the
study. Therefore, all results were based on analyses including both
male and female subjects.
Manipulation Checks and Suspiciousness
All of the subjects in the Performance Condition and none of the
subjects in the Recognition Condition expected a performance test. All
but one of the subjects expected to be tested on their learning of the
gestures. This subject was not included in the analyses. Two subjects
in the Recognition Condition and one subject in the Performance
Condition were withdrawn from the analyses because they were suspicious
that they were being watched while they were observing the slides;
subjects do not overtly mimic the gestures if they believe that they
are being watched (Berger, 1966). All of the other subjects were
included in the analyses.
Reliability of the Experimenter's and Subjects' Reports
The reliability of the experimenter's record of the number of
different hand gestures performed by the subjects was assessed by having
13
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a second person make an independent record of the performance of 15 of
the subjects. The experimenter's record correlated +.99 (p < .001)
with the independent assessment and +.91 (p < .001) with subjects 1
self-reports. The experimenter recorded slightly more mimicry (M=3.26)
than subjects reported (M=2.91)
,
although this difference was not
significant, t_(79)=.77. Considering only whether subjects did or did
not mimic and disregarding the number of gestures mimicked, the
experimenter's record agreed with subjects' self-reports in 91% of the
cases. Four subjects reported engaging in mimicry which the experi-
menter did not see and three subjects reported that they did not mimic
at all when the experimenter observed them mimic. In general, there
was considerable agreement between the subjects and the experimenter
concerning the amount of mimicry that subjects engaged in. This
differs from previous findings that subjects reported performing
significantly fewer gestures than the experimenters observed (Berger,
et al.
,
1979)
.
Self-reported and Observed Mediation
The subjects' self-reported use of "other" mediators (e.g., letters,
numbers, etc.) was not included in the analysis because only 10
subjects reported using "other" mediators.
A two way analysis of variance on self-reported mimicry revealed
a significant main effect for Instructions, F(l,76)=14. 78 , £ < .001.
15
Subjects in the Performance Condition reported engaging in more mimicry
(M=4.03) than subjects in the Recognition Condition (M=1.80). In
addition, 85% of the subjects in the Performance Condition reported
engaging in some mimicry as compared to only 50% of those in the
2
Recognition group, X (1)=9.63, £ < .001. There were no significant
effects due to the Presentation or to the interaction of Instructions
and Presentation.
Analyses of variance performed separately on subjects' self-
reported use of imaginal coding, word coding, and on the total overall
amount of mediation (mimicry, and imaginal and word coding) resulted
in no significant results. However, there was a tendency,
F (1,76) =2. 84, £< .10, for subjects in the Recognition Condition to
report using more word codes (M=2.60) than those in the Performance
Condition (M=1.60).
An analysis of variance based on the experimenter's record of
subjects 1 performance of different gestures revealed only a significant
main effect for Instructions, F(l,76)=16. 50, £ < .001. The experimenter
observed more mimicry in the Performance Condition (M=4.50) than in the
Recognition Condition (M=2.03).
Cochran Q tests (Hays, 1973) were performed separately on subjects'
use of mimicry, imaginal coding, and word coding to determine whether
the probability of using each of the mediators was constant across
gestures. No differences were found between gestures in the amount
of imaginal coding, X
2 (7)=3.61, n.s. However, significant results
were obtained for mimicry, X
2 (7)-75.98, p < .001, and for word coding,
16
X (7)=32.72, p < .001. Contrasts were carried out using a method for
dichotomous variables in a repeated measures design (Marascuilo §
Serlin, 1977). The results indicated that the gestures "pugh," ushh, M
and "call" had a lower probability of being performed (M=0.24) than the
other gestures (M=0.44) and "call, 11 "pray," and "stop 11 had a lower
probability of being word coded (M=0.18) than the others (M=0.32).
Gesture Learning
None of the correlations between the self-reported mediators
achieved significance, either for the study as a whole or within
the different Instruction and Presentation Conditions.
A second analysis was performed to test the association between
the use of word coding and both mimicry and imaginal coding of
individual gestures. For mimicry, each subject was assigned a "match"
score ranging from zero to eight which corresponded to the number of
gestures he or she both mimicked and word coded or neither mimicked
nor word coded. A two way analysis of variance was performed on
these scores to determine whether there were more "matches" in the
Serial Presentation Condition than in the Simultaneous Presentation
Condition, as was predicted. The same procedure was repeated for
imaginal coding. There were no significant effects due to Instructions,
Presentation, or their interaction for either mimicry or imaginal
coding.
17
Chi-square tests using the entire sample of subjects compared the
number of "matches" and the number of "no matches" against that
expected by chance. For mimicry, the expected frequencies were com-
puted from the number of gestures performed and word coded out of 640
(80 subjects each had the opportunity to code eight gestures). The
probability of a "match" equalled the product of the percentage per-
formed and the percentage word coded plus the product of the percentage
not performed and the percentage not word coded. The probability of
a "no match" equalled one minus the probability of a "match". The
identical procedure was repeated for imaginal coding.
The chi- squares revealed that the use of mimicry to mediate
individual gestures was not associated with the use of word codes for
2
those gestures, X (1)=1.36, n.s., while the use of imagery was
associated with the use of word codes for individual gestures,
X
2 (l)=6.49, p < .02.
Relationship Between Mediators and Learning
The number of gestures learned was significantly and positively
correlated with the amount of imaginal coding, r(78)=.24, p < .05,
and with the total overall amount of mediation, r(78)=.39, p < .001.
There was some relationship between the number of gestures learned and
both the amount of mimicry, r(78)=+.21, p=.06, and the amount of word
coding, r(78)=+.20, p=.07.
Correlations were also examined between the amount of learning
and the use of each mediator separately for each Instruction Condition.
18
The relationship between mimicry and learning was significant for the
Recognition group, r(78)=+.29, p < -05, while no relationship was
found for the Performance group, r(78)=+.08, n.s. A significant
relationship was obtained between learning and both imaginal coding,
r(78)=+.34, p < .02, and word coding, r(78)=+.27, p < .05, for the
Performance Condition. For the Recognition Condition, learning was
only marginally related to imaginal coding, r(78)=+.19, p < .12, and
word coding, r(78)=+.20, £=.11.
No differences were obtained between each Presentation Condition
in the relationship of learning with each of the mediators.
Unintentional Mediation
There were no differences in reporting of unintentional mimicry
due to either the Instructions or the Presentation type. About 201
(11/54) of the subjects who mimicked reported unintentional mimicry,
31% (20/65) of those who imaginally coded reported unintentional
imagery, and 30% (13/39) of those who word coded reported unintentional
word coding.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The results of this study provide no evidence to support the
hypothesis that mimicry acts as a temporary coding device. Subjects
in both Presentation Conditions mimicked about the same amount even
though the slide of the gestures was always available in the
Simultaneous Presentation Condition. In addition, there was no
relationship between the use of mimicry and the use of word codes for
individual gestures. If mimicry was acting as a temporary coding device,
it should have given subjects in the Serial Presentation Condition who
were unable to come up with word codes more time to think of such codes.
Evidence was found to support the hypothesis that subjects mimicked
because they expected to have to perform the gestures as a test of their
learning and used mimicry to practice performing the gestures. Sub-
jects who did not expect a performance test mimicked much less than
those who did expect such a test. In addition, nearly all the sub-
jects who expected to have to perform engaged in some mimicry while
only half of the subjects who expected a recognition test did so.
Subjects probably associated a good motor performance with
motoric practice (mimicry) , but felt that practice would be unnecessary
if they would only be required to recognize pictures of the gestures
(as in the Recognition Condition)
.
The results of this study supported the hypothesis that subjects
mimic unintentionally. However, no differences in unintentional
mimicry were obtained due to the different Instructions or
19
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Presentations. The lack of a difference between the two Presentation
Conditions is not surprising since mimicry did not act as a temporary
coding device and neither group was more inclined to mimic to learn
(or less free to mimic unintentionally)
.
The lack of a difference in unintentional mimicry between the
two Instruction Conditions suggests that some of the subjects in the
Performance Condition may not have increased their use of mimicry to
practice their performance of the gestures. Instead, the experimenter's
mention of the performance test may have elicited mimicry unintentional-
ly for these subjects, perhaps by making performing more salient.
The findings of this study suggest that subjects in the previous
studies (Berger, elt al
. ,
1979) who were instructed to learn the
gestures expected a performance test and, therefore, increased their
use of mimicry (as compared to subjects who were instructed to merely
watch the model's performance) to practice performing the gestures.
These subjects may have also used mimicry to test their own ability
to perform the gestures. In fact, subjects may mimic first to test
themselves and, then, to practice their performance. The findings
also indicate that some of the subjects probably mimicked unintentionally,
especially those in the "watch" condition.
There were two other possible causes of mimicry in the previous
studies that were not examined in this investigation. First, the
models in the Berger, et al. (1979) studies were presented on videotape
performing gestures they were observing from slides. Subjects were
told that the model was another subjects from a previous experiment.
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The model's performance may have provided a learning strategy to
subjects who intended to learn the gestures. Second, some of the
subjects in the "watch" condition may have decided to learn the
gestures on their own and were then provided with a learning strategy
from the model's performance.
The results of this study revealed a positive relationship
between subjects' use of imagery and word codes for individual gestures.
However, the hypothesis that imagery acts as a temporary coding device
must be rejected since the subjects in the Serial Presentation Condition
did not use more imaginal codes than those in the Simultaneous
Presentation Condition. Why, then, was the use of imaginal coding
associated with word coding?
Paivio's dual coding model of memory (1971) provides an explana-
tion for the relationship. In this theory, pictures which are clear
and easily recognizable to an observer (such as the gestures) readily
evoke images, since such stimuli are presumably stored in imaginal
form. The images for highly concrete familiar stimuli are associated
with verbal labels in the observers memory. The image, therefore,
yields a verbal code. According to this model, familiar pictures
should yield more imaginal codes than word codes , but the relationship
between these codes should be positive since imaginal coding should
generally evoke verbal labels.
Imagery, then, may help subjects come up with word codes, even
during the presentation by the model. Subjects may form images
that
are more easilv word coded than the model's behavior.
The images may
22
be more vivid, complex, or personally relevant to the subject than the
performance by the model. For example, a subject viewing the gesture
"stop 11 may be unable to verbally code it until he or she forms an
image of a policeman holding up a hand to stop traffic. The image
of the policeman may easily evoke verbal codes while the gesture does
not.
A second possible explanation for the significant relationship
between imagery and word coding is that some of the subjects may have
a general tendency to code symbolically while others may tend not to
code symbolically. In this case, neither the use of imagery or
word coding is a function of the other, but their relationship would be
significant because they are both types of symbolic coding.
Subjects may have been less able to verbally code "call," "pray,"
and "stop" than the other gestures but equally able to imaginally
code them because these gestures were very familiar visually (since
presumably all subjects had seen them frequently before) but not as
clearly recognizable as cultural signs. "Call" and "stop" would
probably have been more readily associated with words if they had been
presented with motion. Even though over 85% of the pretest subjects
could verbally code !tpray," some subjects in this study reported
during the debriefing that they were unable to think of word codes for
this gesture.
"Pugh," "shh," and "call" which were the only gestures involving
the face, were performed less often than the other gestures. This
may be because performing them required more effort and awareness
23
from subjects. A second possibility is that subjects felt inhibited
about mimicking these gestures because they are more noticeable and
less hidden from view than the other gestures. In fact, many subjects
performed all the gestures as inconspicuously as possible (often
without even lifting their hands from their lap) even though they were
alone in the room.
The use of each of the mediators appears to contribute to observa-
tional learning. These findings are consistent with the findings of
previous research on imagery (Ito, 1975; Jeffery, 1976) and word coding
(Berger, et al
. ,
1979; Ito, 1975).
Subjects in the Performance group did not benefit from the use
of mimicry. Within this group, only the use of both imaginal and word
codes were significantly related to learning. For subjects in the
Recognition Condition, however, learning was significantly correlated
only with mimicry. The two other mediators were only marginally
related to learning. This result is surprising since, in the first
Berger, et al . (1979) study, mimicry was not significantly correlated
with learning for subjects who were familiar with the model's behavior.
Perhaps the subjects in the Recognition group did not immediately
recognize the gestures as common cultural signs^ and, therefore, treated
the gestures as unfamiliar behaviors. Subjects in this group who
mimicked may have discovered how familiar the gestures were, and
this helped them to learn. Almost all the subjects in the Performance
Condition engaged in mimicry, and presumably discovered how familiar
the gestures were. The correlation between mimicry and learning may
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have been attenuated in this group because there was little variability
in the amount of mimicry.
The strongest predictor of learning across all conditions was the
amount of overall mediation rather than the use of any particular
mediator. Since there was no difference between conditions in the
amount of overall mediation used, it is not surprising that there were
no significant effects for learning. In general, subjects may simply
use whatever coding strategy is most convenient or readily available,
whatever mediators first come to mind.
FOOTNOTES
1. In a pretest for the experiment, open ended questions
asking subjects their reason for mimicking did not reveal differences
between subjects who intended to learn the gestures and those who did
not intend to learn them (observers who were instructed to merely watch
the presentation). In fact, the majority of subjects in both conditions
reported that they mimicked to learn the gestures. Subjects in the
watch condition may have engaged in unintentional mimicry but were
reluctant to report it. It was hoped that providing subjects with a
check list in this experiment would encourage them to report unin-
tentional mimicry if it occurred.
2. This hypothesis differs from the two-staged coding hypothesis
proposed by Bandura and Jeffery (1973). In the present case, imaginal
codes would give subjects a longer amount of time to think of familiar
word codes for the model's behavior. Bandura and Jeffery hypothesized
that a two- staged coding process would be necessary for long-term
retention of a model ! s behavior. Subjects would first learn the behavior
by employing symbolic codes assigned by the experimenter (which are
presumably unfamiliar codes) and, second, retain the behavior over time
by applying mnemonic (familiar) codes to the unfamiliar codes and
rehearsing them periodically.
3. Subjects in this pretest were instructed to write down the
first word that came into their minds after seeing each gesture. The
slides were presented for about one second each with about two seconds
between the slides so that subjects would have time to write. Hie
following percentages indicate the number of subjects out of 40 who
gave the modal response to each of the gestures: "stop," 88%;
"OK," 98%; "two," 93%; "pugh," 95%; "shh," 93%; "you," 93%; "call," 85%;
"pray," 88%.
4. The words used to refer to the gestures were the most frequent
responses of the subjects in the pretest.
5. The amount of time each gesture was presented was chosen to
be about the same as that used in previous research (Berger, et al.
,
1979) to provide some comparison between the studies.
6. Subjects in the Berger, et al. (1979) studies may have had less
difficulty recognizing familiar gestures because they were observing
a videotape of a model actively performing the gestures while subjects
in this study observed stationary gestures on slides.
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